It would be really useful to have more client-side control over media storage. That way, I could better manage storage growth without wiping entire threads.
For example, being able to see all media across chats, sort by file size, and optionally group by conversation would make it much easier to clean things up.
chimeracoder · 7m ago
> It would be really useful to have more client-side control over media storage. That way, I could better manage storage growth without wiping entire threads.
> For example, being able to see all media across chats, sort by file size, and optionally group by conversation would make it much easier to clean things up.
I have good news for you: this already exists.
On Android:
Settings >> Data and Storage >> Manage Storage >> Review Storage
This allows you to view all of your media, files, and audio across all chats, sorted by the amount of storage used. You can also delete those files individually without affecting the rest of the chat.
You can also do the same thing within a conversation.
akkartik · 21m ago
This looks brilliant. I just hope they make it easy to do test restores. In particular, I want to test restore without perturbing my main device. Let me restore using the secret key on a new device.
When I install Signal on a computer it won't show me message history. Will backups allow me to view _all_ my message history on a computer? A big screen is very helpful for browsing lots of messages.
growse · 11m ago
Full message content seems to be free, with the option to pay £1.59pm for all media included (45 days of media included in the free tier).
Seems pretty reasonable?
amluto · 15m ago
Wow, maybe as a side effect users will be able to migrate between Android and iOS without losing their message history.
Seriously, why is the migration protocol completely different on the two platforms?
antris · 54s ago
> Seriously, why is the migration protocol completely different on the two platforms?
Because they don't want to make jumping to the competitor too easy.
crystaln · 2m ago
This is mentioned as a future feature.
rogerkirkness · 31m ago
The main way I specialize messages at this point is basically 'Am I going to want this later'? If the answer is yes, I use email. If not I use Signal. It's interesting this was the most requested feature... it wouldn't be for me even though I love Signal.
tkel · 7m ago
It's important for Signal groups, because on a new device without a backup the groups you were in don't show up until someone sends a message in the group. Say if you were the only admin in an announcement-only group, no one else can send a message in the group, so that group is now lost to you.
Marsymars · 9m ago
I like this idea, but I don't think I'd ever be able to convince my wife to run that analysis on any particular message before she decides whether to email or to message me on Signal.
noman-land · 21m ago
You can imagine even the same person having some conversations they would want to keep and some they wouldn't.
y7 · 20m ago
Without paying for remote backups, can I just manage my own backup on my own hard drive, and restore it when I want to?
navigate8310 · 13m ago
>The technology that underpins this initial version of secure backups will also serve as the foundation for more secure backup options in the near future. Our future plans include letting you save a secure backup archive to the location of your choosing, alongside features that let you transfer your encrypted message history between Android, iOS, and Desktop devices.
nairb774 · 10m ago
Yep. Local backup generation has been around for at least a few years. You can have signal make a backup for you every day. You just need to get it off the device. This looks to be adding a remote option for this existing feature.
jewel · 13m ago
Yes! That has been supported for a long while. At least on Android, go to Settings -> Chats -> Chat Backups. Set up a schedule and a passphrase and a folder, and it will export your chats every day.
I do that and then sync that folder with another computer using SyncThing.
rconti · 25m ago
Are they still refusing to do anything about their painful 30 day device unlinking policy? If they can support full backups, surely they can accomplish this.
I'm confused, I've restored Signal from encrypted backups before. I did it like 4 months ago. What's this feature?
Marsymars · 6m ago
Cloud storage for your backup.
chimeracoder · 4m ago
> I'm confused, I've restored Signal from encrypted backups before. I did it like 4 months ago. What's this feature?
Those backups are stored locally, are platform-specific (Android-only), and there is no feasible way to automate their transfer to any other device, which means that either you have to manually manage them regularly, or you risk losing your entire message history if your phone suddenly dies (or is stolen, or broken beyond repair, etc.).
This is a true automated, off-site backup feature.
lencastre · 1m ago
measuring the temperature of hell…
…
…
nope, still hot
chimeracoder · 9m ago
I know plenty of people who have inadvertently lost their entire messaging history because their phone broke or was lots and they couldn't transfer messages directly from the old phone to the new one. Signal allows you to export backups of messages to a file, but only on Android - the iOS version does not. This is a great feature not only for users who are less technically inclined than the average HN reader, but for any user who doesn't want to go through the tedious process of manually backing up their messages periodically but doesn't want to risk losing their message history if their phone has one unfortunate encounter with gravity.
My only concern reading this is that I hope they don't remove the manual export feature once this is rolled out. I know that that feature has been technically complicated to support, but it's important for users to preserve the option to maintain control over their backups, if they want to manage backups themselves, alongside the option of having a more convenient, automated approach.
elvisloops · 17m ago
I can't believe Signal is doing this.
Signal is known for its cutting-edge cryptographic protocol, but this feature has the effect of throwing that out the window and replacing it with a single static key. If a device with this enabled goes through the whole advanced protocol to receive a message (double ratcheting etc), then turns around and uploads it back to Signal’s servers with a static key, isn't that a roundabout way of replacing all of signal's protocol and its forward secrecy with a static key that has no forward secrecy?
They’re calling it "opt-in," but it doesn't look like that's actually true? You can’t know whether someone you’re talking to -- who may not understand the implications -- has enabled it. In group chats, it looks like a single person turning it on eliminates signal protocol for everyone in the chat.
Based on this post, the only way to actually opt out of this is to force disappearing messages to be enabled for a time under 24 hours for every chat, which is pretty frustrating.
Signal already lags other messengers in reliability, speed, and features. The reason people use it is for its uncompromising security. Shipping something that weakens that foundation undermines the reason people use Signal.
amluto · 4m ago
It seems plausible that the protocol could be designed such that the device doesn’t know the recovery key. The key serves three purposes: (a) identifying the backup when a user tries to restore it, (b) authenticating that user to the restore API, and (c) allowing the user to decrypt the backup.
(a) is much simpler if there is a fixed identifier of a user, but that identifier doesn’t need to be the entire key or even part of it — it could be some derived material.
(b) isn’t strictly required but I would be very uneasy about allowing anyone who stole a user’s device to download even the ciphertext of that user’s future chats. Also, there’s an obvious issue that even the ciphertext reveals something about the amount of activity from the user.
(c) requires that the restoring user hold something like a private key, that said key can be derived using the restore code, and that the user’s device does not know the private key.
One straightforward-ish solution would be for the user’s device to generate, once, a key pair, a user ID, and a backup API key. (The ID and API key could be generated server-side.). The restore key is (user ID, private key). The device retains (user ID, API key, public key). To upload backups, the device establishes a secure session, sends the user ID, proves knowledge of the API key, uploads a backup, and receives a new API key. The old API key is revoked.
This means:
1. The device does not retain the ability to download future backups.
2. A clone of a device (say id the device leaks its secrets somehow) cannot be used to upload new backups on an ongoing basis without being noticed because of the API key rotation.
Marsymars · 12m ago
> They’re calling it "opt-in," but it doesn't look like that's actually true? You can’t know whether someone you’re talking to -- who may not understand the implications -- has enabled it. In group chats, it looks like a single person turning it on eliminates signal protocol for everyone in the chat.
TBF Signal already supports automated key-protected backup (and has for years), it's just stored on-device, but there's no way to know what the other party is doing with that on-device backup.
elvisloops · 9m ago
There's a big difference to me between storing it on device and someone else's servers.
Marsymars · 3m ago
Sure, but you already have no way of knowing which one the other parties in your chats are doing.
I already sync my Signal backups to the cloud, because that's the most practical and time/cost-effective way to have a 3-2-1 backup system for my chats.
fsflover · 5m ago
Why does it matter if everything is encrypted?
chimeracoder · 14m ago
> They’re calling it "opt-in," but it doesn't look like that's actually true? You can’t know whether someone you’re talking to -- who may not understand the implications -- has enabled it. In group chats, it looks like a single person turning it on eliminates signal protocol for everyone in the chat.
People already can export backups of the messages they receive, in plain text, and publish those on the Internet if they way.
Signal's threat model has never included "you are directly messaging an adversarial party and expect to retain control over redistribution of those messages".
elvisloops · 6m ago
I think the difference is that this is all happening in the app as a supported flow. If simply enabling a toggle in Signal (likely without understanding the implications) is now considered "adversarial," then I think that's a problem
For example, being able to see all media across chats, sort by file size, and optionally group by conversation would make it much easier to clean things up.
> For example, being able to see all media across chats, sort by file size, and optionally group by conversation would make it much easier to clean things up.
I have good news for you: this already exists.
On Android:
Settings >> Data and Storage >> Manage Storage >> Review Storage
This allows you to view all of your media, files, and audio across all chats, sorted by the amount of storage used. You can also delete those files individually without affecting the rest of the chat.
You can also do the same thing within a conversation.
When I install Signal on a computer it won't show me message history. Will backups allow me to view _all_ my message history on a computer? A big screen is very helpful for browsing lots of messages.
Seems pretty reasonable?
Seriously, why is the migration protocol completely different on the two platforms?
Because they don't want to make jumping to the competitor too easy.
I do that and then sync that folder with another computer using SyncThing.
https://community.signalusers.org/t/dont-unlink-devices-afte...
Those backups are stored locally, are platform-specific (Android-only), and there is no feasible way to automate their transfer to any other device, which means that either you have to manually manage them regularly, or you risk losing your entire message history if your phone suddenly dies (or is stolen, or broken beyond repair, etc.).
This is a true automated, off-site backup feature.
My only concern reading this is that I hope they don't remove the manual export feature once this is rolled out. I know that that feature has been technically complicated to support, but it's important for users to preserve the option to maintain control over their backups, if they want to manage backups themselves, alongside the option of having a more convenient, automated approach.
Signal is known for its cutting-edge cryptographic protocol, but this feature has the effect of throwing that out the window and replacing it with a single static key. If a device with this enabled goes through the whole advanced protocol to receive a message (double ratcheting etc), then turns around and uploads it back to Signal’s servers with a static key, isn't that a roundabout way of replacing all of signal's protocol and its forward secrecy with a static key that has no forward secrecy?
They’re calling it "opt-in," but it doesn't look like that's actually true? You can’t know whether someone you’re talking to -- who may not understand the implications -- has enabled it. In group chats, it looks like a single person turning it on eliminates signal protocol for everyone in the chat.
Based on this post, the only way to actually opt out of this is to force disappearing messages to be enabled for a time under 24 hours for every chat, which is pretty frustrating.
Signal already lags other messengers in reliability, speed, and features. The reason people use it is for its uncompromising security. Shipping something that weakens that foundation undermines the reason people use Signal.
(a) is much simpler if there is a fixed identifier of a user, but that identifier doesn’t need to be the entire key or even part of it — it could be some derived material.
(b) isn’t strictly required but I would be very uneasy about allowing anyone who stole a user’s device to download even the ciphertext of that user’s future chats. Also, there’s an obvious issue that even the ciphertext reveals something about the amount of activity from the user.
(c) requires that the restoring user hold something like a private key, that said key can be derived using the restore code, and that the user’s device does not know the private key.
One straightforward-ish solution would be for the user’s device to generate, once, a key pair, a user ID, and a backup API key. (The ID and API key could be generated server-side.). The restore key is (user ID, private key). The device retains (user ID, API key, public key). To upload backups, the device establishes a secure session, sends the user ID, proves knowledge of the API key, uploads a backup, and receives a new API key. The old API key is revoked.
This means:
1. The device does not retain the ability to download future backups.
2. A clone of a device (say id the device leaks its secrets somehow) cannot be used to upload new backups on an ongoing basis without being noticed because of the API key rotation.
TBF Signal already supports automated key-protected backup (and has for years), it's just stored on-device, but there's no way to know what the other party is doing with that on-device backup.
I already sync my Signal backups to the cloud, because that's the most practical and time/cost-effective way to have a 3-2-1 backup system for my chats.
People already can export backups of the messages they receive, in plain text, and publish those on the Internet if they way.
Signal's threat model has never included "you are directly messaging an adversarial party and expect to retain control over redistribution of those messages".